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The past three decades have seen an appreciable growth 
of interest in ethics both here and in Europe, with discus-
sion equally fruitful in both the classical and modern po-
sitions. The topics discussed, varied and wide-ranging as 
the.problems they consider, continue to provide appreciat-
ion for the complexities that ethics must treat, whether the 
views set forth have been one's own or that of a major fig-
ure. 
This thesis is of the latter kind. It centers direct-
ly on one theme in Aristotle's ethics, viz., the relation 
there of Nature and moral excellence. The topic is new, 
little having been said about it previously. Of course, in 
one way or another it has made its way into different dis-
cussions about the Ethics, but more often than not just in 
passing and not as a developed topic, which it is here. 
This the first chapter should make clear. There the 
secondary literature is surveyed, showing that it is only 
recently that Nature in the Ethics has been given any sig-
nificant consideration at all. Previously, Aristotle's 
theory of moral goodness was discussed almost exclusively 
in light of the notion of phronesis. This, however, though 
instructive, is only one way of regarding the topic. When 
we approach it in light of his theory of Nature in the 
Ethics, our view widens. 
Accordingly, chapter two locates the relation of 
ii 
Nature to the morally good. Studying its role in the Pro-
trepticus, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Nichomachean Ethics, 
we can see that it has a normative role, which is also con-
firmed in the Politics. And this normative role arises 
from Aristotle's general conviction that Nature, which is 
responsible for the ends of all natural beings, is ari agency 
of good. Their ends, therefore, are their good; and thus 
man's end is his good. Human actions conducive to that end 
are therefore good, and those detractive from it, bad. That 
is, they are according to or contrary to Nature respectively. 
And it is with this in mind that the ethician, for Aristotle, 
assigns a moral value to human actions. 
Chapter three is concerned with the moral habits in 
general and Aristotle's belief that none of these is ours 
by nature. Instead, he holds that it is we who bring about 
our states of character and hence their excellence or vice. 
Nevertheless, the propensity to virtue is ours by nature 
and this, accordingly, has also merited discussion here. 
These propensities, however, are not virtues in the 
full sense. True virtue involves reason and th{s we see in 
chapter four. Guided by a reason that is right the pass-
ions, Aristotle points out, achieve their proper excellenc-
es, their best states. Reason, like Nature then, emerges 
as an agency of good. And this allows us to draw some par-
allels between our own good acts and Nature's operations. 
iii 
Virtue can now be accurately described as an imitation of 
Nature. And this is best seen in the contemplative man that 
the Nichomachean Ethics describes, he who has all the vir-
tues and with it the best of all goods. 
The contemplative man, finally, the conclusion sug-
gests, is the best expression of Nature's aspiration for 
the divine. · Summary remarks are offered here too, bringing 
the thesis to a close. 
It should be noted here that this study, though dis-
cussing in the first chapter some aspects of the well-known 
problems of the developmental hypothesis and Aristotle's 
thought, is not directly concerned with it. Such a dis-
cussion arose because the first chapter is an account of the 
previous literature. And the purpose of that was primarily 
to show to what extent others had considered the theory of 
Nature in Aristotle's Ethics. 
The approach here, instead, is to detail those themes 
about Nature that are consistent in the writings where Ar-
istotle treats ethical problems at length. These are the 
Protrepticus, Eudemian Ethics, Nichomachean Ethics, Pol-
itics, and a work traditionally ascribed to the Aristotelian 
tradition, the magna Moralia, with occasional references to 
Aristotle's other writings, when appropriate. 
I would, finally, like to thank those who read the 
thesis along with me: Reverend Theodore Tracy, S.J., of the 
iv 
University of Illinois, whose own work on the Ethics has 
added significantly to our appreciation of Aristotle as 
physiobiologist; Dr. Frank Yartz of Loyola University, 
whose encouragement and suggestions were always most help-
ful; and to my director, Reverend Lothar Nurnberger, S.J., 
also of Loyola University. It is he who first suggested 
the thesis topic to me when we worked on the Ethics two 
years ago, and whose instruction and skill were wholly in-
valuable during the course of my writing. It is, in fact, 
only on his account that I was willing to explore this 
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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The morally good, how it is known and in what it con-
sists, for Aristotle has been variously interpreted during 
this century, and for the most part only in light of his 
account of phronesis. The first extensive, and for some 
time most influential, discussion of it appeared in Werner 
Jaeger's Aristotle: Fundamentals~ the History of~~-
1 velopment. Tracing the usage of phronesis in the Protrept-
icus, Eudemian Ethics, and Nichomachean Ethics, he argued 
for a aevelopment in Aristotle's ethical theory-- from a 
Platonism in the Protrepticus, where phronesis is nourished 
by the objective reality of the Forms, to a purely subject-
ivist theory in the Nichomachean Ethics. Here phronesis is 
reduced to the discernment of means to an end that has been 
"determined by the moral will''. 2 The universal norms of the 
Protrepticus no longer function as guides for right conduct. 
The standard now, according to Jaeger, is rather "the auto-
nomous conscience of the ethically educated person". 3 "The 
1- First published in 1923 in German by the We~dmannsche 
Buchhandlung, Berlin, as Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer 
Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. In discussing and quoting 
from Jaeger here we will use ill. Jaeger, Aristotle: Funda-
mentals £! the History of His Development, translated with 
the authors corrections and additions by R. Robinson. Ox-
ford: at the Clarendon Press, 1962, Second Edition (hereafter 
referred to simply as Jaeger, Fundamentals). 
2- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 242. 
3- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 88, n. 1. 
1 
2 
essence of moral value is now developed out of the subject-
ive self", and thus the "transcendental norm" has become 
"internalized" and with that voided of its universal valid-
ity. "For there is no imperative that is binding on all men 
equally, except a purely formal generalization devoid of 
content. Aristatle's aim is to unite the idea of complete 
obedience to the norm with the greatest individual variety. 
The moral personality is 'a law to itself 1 ." 4 
The developmental hypothesis, of course, held great 
sway, as did Jaeger's reading of the Protrepticus. 5 The 
force of both today, though, has greatly diminished, and it 
is not without interest to recount the change in opinion. 
r~ will provide for a clearer understanding of how Nature 
and the morally good are related for Aristotle, especially 
since that relationship seems to have been so narrowly con-
strued or simply ignored in the reaction to Jaeger, and 
which has formed almost the entire bulf of the literature on 
the Ethics since Jaeger. Five major figures, then, will be 
matter for discussion here, beginning with Jaeger~. 
The general preoccupation of Jaeger's Fundamentals is 
Aristotle's theory of being. Accordingly, {1) Aristotle was 
first a Platpnist for whom being meant the Forms; .. {2) This 
4- Jaeger, Fundamentals, pp. 395-6. 
5- See, e.g., E. Bignone, L'Aristotele perduto e la Formaz-
ione filosofia di Epicure. Florence: La Nueva Italia, 1936, 
Two Volumes; P. Ulilpert, Zwei aristotelische Fruhschriften · 
liber die I deenlehre. Reg8fi'S1jurg: Habbel, 1949, pp. 64-5-; 
and R. Gauthier, La morale d'Aristote. Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 1958, pp. 6-7. 
3 
was replaced by a metaphysics heavily dominated by God, and 
that in turn by a (3) thoroughgoing empiricism. In the Pro-
........... 
6 trepticus then, an early work, Aristotle for Jaeger is a 
Platonist, a view he arrived at by his analysis of how phro-
nesis (~pov~al~ ) is used there. 7 Its object, according to 
Jaeger, are the Platonic Forms, as is clear from the Platonic 
language in which its object is described, e.g., au~a ~a 
8 Phronesis, • 
then, is the contemplative knowledge of the Platonic Forms, 
which at the same time, however, is also directive of con-
duct. Being and value, which for Plato were one, have not 
yet become disjoined according to Jaeger, and therefore the 
. 9 
Forms nourish both theoretic and practical knowledge. 
Hence, phronesis is both theoretic and practical wisd-
om and is, according to Jaeger, directive of conduct more 
geometrico. 10 In the Protrepticus, that is, is an "ideal of 
6- Ross dates it around 353 B.C. See Sir David Ross, Se-
lect Fragments. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1952, P: x; 
cf. I. Bywater, "On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle", Journal 
£! Philology, 2 (1869), 56-69. 
7- "In the Protrepticus its meaning is purely Platonic", 
Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 81. See also ibid., p. 82: "The 
Protrepticus understands phronesis in the full Platonic 
sen~e." 
8- "Both the language and the philosophical content of this 
passage is pure Plato", Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 90. See 
also ibid., P• 91. 
9- Jaeger, Fundamentals, pp. 83-4. 
10- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 86. 
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geometrical ethics"~ 11 Ethics, here, is an "exact science" 
while politics, which Aristotle "considers inseparable from 
ethics" has "the exact in itself for object."12 Knowing 
what is right in the concrete circumstance, therefore, re-
quires reasoning geometrically from the Forms, which are 
both the "exact" objects for knowledge as well as ethical 
norms.
13 
Persuasive as this reading of the Protrepticus w~s in 
1923, in our day it has ceased to be so, and on two counts. 
(1) Von Fritz and Kapp have shown a number of doctrines in 
the Protreeticus to be clearly present in Aristotle's later 
writings, thereby- rendering tenuous Jaeger's Platonizing of 
the Protrepticus. 14 E. Frank advanced reasonings which di-
rectly questioned the position that Aristotle ever ascribed 
to the theory of Forms, 15 while s. mansion has aigued for 
16 the same, but on different grounds. 
11- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 87. See also ibid., p. 85: 
"This ideal of mathematical exactness is contrary to every-
thing that Aristotle teaches in his Ethics and Politics a-
bout the method of these studies." 
12- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 85. 
13- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 93. 
· 14- K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of 
Athens and Related Texts. New York: Hafner, 1950, p. 34:-
15- ·E. Frank, "The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Ar-
istotle", American Journal .E!.f. Philology, 61 (1940), 34-53 
and 166-85. 
16- s. mansion, "Contemplation and Action in Aristotle's 
Protrepticus" in Aristotle and Plato In the Mid-Fourth Cent-
ury, I. DUring and G.E.L. Owen (edd.):- Gbteborg: EleanderS 
Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960, p. 74. 
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(2) I. During has argued against Jaeger's characteri7-
ation of the Protreptican ethics as proceeding ~ geomet-
rico,17 as has J. Donald menan, whose own reading improved 
upon and further substantiated During's criticism.18 In its 
stead, though, During opted for the autonomous insight of 
the._ o'1l:ouoa' o' 
ble. 19 
' , 
<lVT)p as the standard of the morally valua-
This is only one aspect, however, of his disagreement 
with Jaeger's Protrepticus. In addition, During rejects the 
belief in a Platonic Aristotle, 20 and sees in the Protrepti-
cus a marked distinction between theoretic and practical 
21 knowledge. 
I• On this last point During was not successful. Using 
the same procedure by which During came to this position, 
viz., an analysis of the language in the Protrepticus, 22 
17- I. DUring, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus" in Auteur 
d 1 Aristote. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Lou-
vain, 1955, 81-97. 
18- J. Donald monan, moral Knowledge and I!§ Methodology in 
Aristotle. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press~ 1968, pp. 9-11 
and 26-8 (hereafter monan, Moral Knowledge). . 
19- I. During, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus", ..2.2• cit., 
pp. 93-4. 
20- I. DUring, "Aristotle and the Theory of Ideas", Eranos 
37 (1938), 120-45. Cf. I. D~ring, "Aristotle In the Prot-
repticus", Q.Q. cit., pp. 91-2. 
21- I. DUring, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus", ..2.2• cit., 
PP• 89-90. See, however, S. mansion, "Contemplation and 
Action in Aristotle's Protrepticus", ..2.2• cit. She offers an 
alternative view, viz., that moral wisdom is the practical 
fruit of metaphysical speculation. 
22- For this kind of analysis in During see his "Aristotle 
In the Protrepticus", QQ. cit., p. 89. 
6 
E. de Strycher showed that "the language of the Fragments 
gives us no conclusive evidence" on what the Protrepticus 
teaches regarding the relation between theoretic and pract-
23 ical knowledge. And while his rejection of Jaeger's Pla-
tonic Aristotle is, as we have seen, widely shared, his in-
terpretation of the norm for ethical conduct, viz., the 
, is not. 
II For During, this theory of moral autonomy is the 
central feature of Aristotle's ethics, and is consistently 
held throughout. It is, furthermore, the dominant ethical 
theme of the Protrepticus, the only ethical treatise in 
which "there is no mention at all of the mean." Instead, 
is sovereign, in that he knows 
what is right and wrong since (1) "his actions are lJJ-
IJ.T}O'lc; ab'twv axp&j3wv ", and (2) are what "such a man would 
choose, if his choice followed his knowledge." 24 
Such a knowledge, however, is not a~ geometricus, 
nor even a reasoning from established norms. Rather it is 





O.VT)p "to judge arig~t in all 
23- E. de Strycher, "On the First Section of Fragment 5a of 
the Protrepticus" in Aristotle and Plato .!.!! the ffiid-Fourth 
Century, ££• cit., p. 100. 
24- I. DUring, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus"; .Q£• EJ:!., 
pp. 93-6. 
25- ~-' p. 94. 
7 
This theme, being present for D~ring in all three 
26 
ethical tracts, prompted him to deny any difference in 
outlook between the early and later ethics. 
The development does not follow a straight line, which, 
as Jaeger thought, can be measured in terms of distance 
from Plato ••• we should rather think of a boomerang 
curve, for in the last !J.E9ooo~ of the Nichomachean 
Ethics, after having made an excursion in the field of 
_~mpirical sociology, Aristotle returns to hLs old hunt-
ing grounds and comes nearer to the Protrepticus than in 
any other part of the ethical works. 27 
Whether or not this last observation is correct, the 
justification for it has recently been questioned by menan. 
II Though siding with During that Jaeger's theory of a mos 
geometricus in the Protrepticus is unfounded, 28 he critic-
It izes During's suggestion that the Protrepticus is ~domin-
a ted" by the concept of the cmouocil o~ I ' avT)p , especial-
ly since there is only one text there supporting During's 
. t• 29 pos~ ~on. A further difficulty he cites is that D~ring 
has not elaborated on how this inccimmunicable knowledge of 
the morally good finds concrete application in everyday 
life. The reason, Monan believes, is obvious enough: "the 
~ - ~ ., -. - -· 
method of moral knowledge employed by Aristotle in the Pro-
- . 30 
trepticus is not adequately desc~ibed." To resolve this 
26- ibid., pp. 91-2. These three are the Protrepticus, f..!:!-
demian-Ethics, and Nichomachean Ethics. 
27- ~., pp. 96-7. 
28- menan, moral Knowledge, p. 26; p. 54. 
29- menan, moral Knowledge, pp. 11-12; p. 27. 
30- menan, Moral Knowledge, P• 34. 
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difficulty, monan mod~fies the difference D~ring found be-
tween theoretical and practical in the Protrepticus. The 
phronimos, according to Monan, is the only competent judge 
of the moral good in concrete circumstances, not because of 
any "creative autonomy" but on account of "his possession of 
a philosophic wisdom which is to be reduced to practice." 31 
This view is characteristic of rfionan's general reading of 
the Ethics, as we shall see later when we discuss his views 
at greater length. 
,. 
llihile During, then, levelled his criticism primarily 
against Jaeger's Protrepticus, others have done the same to 
Jaeger's reading of the Eudemian Ethics. Using the doctrine 
of phronesis again as the key to his finding~, Jaeger see~ 
it there still as 
strictly confined to the contemplation of the divine 
principle, and without it ethical action is impossible; 
the only innovation is that the objects of contemplation 
are no longer Plato's Ideas but tne transcendentalGod 
of the original metaphysics ••• ethical action is striv-
ing towards God. 32 
Thus, "in the E udemian Ethics A_ristotle is still ex-
pressing the direct relevance of God to moral action, as he 
had done earlier by means of the Platonic conception of the 
absolute norm." 33 The only difference now is that God is 
31- ·monan, moral Knowledge, p. 36o 
32- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 240. See ibido, p. 239: "By 
ghronesis the Eudemian Ethics understands like Plato and the 
Protrepticus, the philosophical faculty that beholds the 
highest real value, God, in transcendental contemplation." 
33- Ja~ger, Fundamentals, p. 242. 
9 
asserted as the absolute value or the highest goad. Will 
and command, then, "arise only when reason or phronesis de-
votes itself to the contemplation of this being." 34 
Contemplation, therefore, is "the standard of will 
and action" in the Eudemian Ethics, while phronesis remains 
"both theoretical knowledge of supersensible being and 
practical moral insight." 35 moral action, in other words, 
is judged according to whether or not it conduces to con-
templation, in light of a wisdom that is "partly the know-
ledge of an objecti~e value ( 9e(l.)p'r)'tl'X.OV ), and partly 
the application of this knowledge to human behaviour." 36 
All this, however, according to Jaeger, is discarded 
in the Nichomachean Ethics. "There are no universal norms, 
there is no measure except the individual living measure of 
the autonomous ethical person, and phronesis is concerned 
not with the universal, but the particular."37 "It is not 
speculation but deliberation ••• it is concerned not with the 
universal but the fleeting details of life, and ••• therefore 
does not have-the highest and most valuable thing in the 
-t .• 36 universe for objec .' wrts- f~nction is ••• to disco~er 
-
the right means of attaining the end determined by the moral 
34- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 242. 
35- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 239. 
36- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 242. 
37- Jaeger, Fundamentals, pp. 87-8. 
38- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 83. 
10 
will" 39 which is now grounded in a subjective self. 
The Platonism of the Protrepticus, then, collapses 
into a subjectivist ethics which, for Jaeger, is Aristotle's 
final view on the matter. And the Eudemian Ethics, the 
"theonomic ethics ••• of pure devotion to God" fades. Con-
templation 
becomes little more than an objective if idealized des-
cription of the life of the scholar devoted to research, 
rising at the end to the intuition of the ultimate force 
that guides the spheres ••• The strength of the later 
Ethics lies rather in its parts, with their analysis of 
concrete moral types, ~nd-in it~-rich and urbane human- -
ity. 40 
D.J. Allan is pe~haps the first to-have dismissed this 
view. In a lively but erudite study he challenged the gen-
eral consensus of a gradual evolution of Aristotle's 
thought, 41 as well as Jaeger's description of phronesis in 
the Nichomachean Ethics. 42 There he quite conclusively 
showed that it has to do with both the means and end of hum-
an activity, while Monan has cited texts to contradict 
Jaeger's picture of phronesis in the Eudemian Ethics. 43 
In addition, two articles by Allan in 1953 and 1955 
continu-ed th-e dispute,- taking into account, ·however the lit-
39- Jaeger, fundamentals, p. 247. 
40- Jaeger, fundamentals, p. 243. 
41- D.J. Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle. London: The 
Home University Library, 1952, p. 14. 
42- ~., pp. 180-2. 
43- Menan, Moral Knowledge, pp. 138-9. 
11 
erature of the nineteenth century. 44 While Teichmaller, 
Trendelenburg, and Zeller, Allan points out, all held that 
phronesis in the Nichomachean Ethics has to do with both 
the right end and the right means to it, Julius Walter 
ascribed the apprehension of the end to moral virtue, limit-
ing phronesis exclusively to deliberation about the means to 
it.- This view, Allan further notes, became Zeller's, and 
thus Burnet's and, as a result, all of Oxfo~d's. 
R. Loaning, however, in 1903 disputed Walter's claim, 
showing that prudence, as right kn-owledge accompanied by 
right desire, not only posits the right end, but also is the 
virtue of right deliberation and choice about the means to 
that end. A~lan•s 1953 essay repeats and reinforces Loen-
ing's findings with, however, the texts needed to end the 
d . t 45 l.SpU e. 
Gauthier, agreeing with Allan's findings, 46 presented 
44- See D.J. Allan, "Aristotle's Account of the Origin of 
moral Principles" in Aetas du XIe Congr~s International de 
Philosophie. Amsterdam: The North Holland\Publishing_ Com-
pany, 1953, Vol. XII, pp. 1~1-7; and "The Practical Syllog~ 
ism" in Auteur d'Aristote, .££• cit., pp. 325-40. 
45- "That prac-tical reason formulates the good is the doct-
rine of t~e De Anima, and appears beyond doubt from the fol-
lowing passages of the Ethics: VI, 1139a 21 ••• , VI, 1142b 31 
••• , VII, 1152-b 1~ 1' D.J. Allan, "Aristotle's Account of the 
Origin of moral Principles", .Q.Q.• cit.,- p~ 125. 
, 
46- R. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L'Ethigue ~ Nicomague, in-
troduction, traduction, et commentaire~ Louvain: Publicat-
ions Universitaires de Louvain, 1958, Tome I, p. 28*; and 
R. Gauthier, La morale d'Aristote, !?.2• cit., pp ... 83 and 94. 
12 
47 a view of the Ethics far different from Jaeger's. In 
/-
L'Ethigue ~ Nicomague he argues for the similarity of teach-
ing in the Eudemian Ethics and Nichomachean Ethics, based 
upon the doctrine of moral knowledge in each. Phronesis in 
both tracts furnishes objective norms for human praxis and 
in light of the true end of human activity. Jaeger's dis-
tinction, then, of a theonomic ethics in the Eudemian Eth-
ics and the autonomy-of the individual conscience in the 
Nichomachean_Ethics is unfoun_ded. 48 . Aristotle, on the c_on-
trary, had already in the Eudemian Ethics discarded the Pla- --
tonic theory of phronesis, which he had'-sb ar-de-ntly 'espoused 
in the Protrepticus, 49 and in~tead began- to formulate an 
ethics built upon his own anthropology. 50 This, in fact, 
47- Not entirely different, however. He sees some merit 
in Jaeger's position on amos geometricus in the Protrepti-
cus and thinks the theory of moral knowledge ih the Etidemian 
"ftiiics to parallel,this somewhat. On this seeR. Gauthier 
and J.Y .• Jolif, l'Ethigue a Nicomague, £E• cit., p. 29*, and 
R. Gauthier, La Morale d'Aristote, £E• cit., pp. 18, 44, and 
45. 
, 
48- R. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L'Ethigue a Nicomague, ~· 
cit., p. 29*. See also R. Gauthier, La Morale d'Aristote, 
£E• cit., p. 95. 
49- Gauthier, in contrast to most of the contemporary read-
ers of the- Protrepticus, agrees with Jaeger 1 s theory· of'- the 
Platonic Protrepticus. SeeR. Gauthier, La morale d'Arist-_ 
ate, £E• cit., pp. 6..;.7. · --· · · · · ·· 
50- Though he does not elaborate this, Gauthier seems to be 
saying that in the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics Aristot-
le's ethical theory is now discussed in terms of man as a 
substantial unity in contrast to the Platonic theory of man 
in the Protrepticus where soul and,body are in conflict. 
See R. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L'Ethigue ~ Nicomague, .2.2• · 
ill•' P.• 30* • 
13 
''com~ande pour une large part la doctrine" 51 while phrones-
/ / is, though admittedly "practique" and "impregne de desir" 
remains primarily "intellectuelle". 52 
These last two conclusions, novel in interpretation 
and set forth in~ morale d'Aristote, were summarily dis-
missed by monan, the last major figure in our survey here. 
He rightly noted that Gauthier in fact wavers on the diffi-
cult problem_ of determining -the nature of phro-nesis- -i.-e • ., 
deciding whether or not it is intellectual-- and was not at 
all clear on what he meant by an anthropological ethics.53 
To this last point ~e will return in our second chapt~r, 
after Menan's views have been discussed. 
Monan's work, Moral Knowledge and Its methodology In 
Aristotle, is the most significant for our purposes here 
since, unlike the previous literature, it is the first to 
discuss the role of Nature in moral goodness for Aristotle 
at any length. Previous scholarship, being in large a re-
action to Jaeger, focused primarily on only one aspect of 
it, viz., _i~s relation to phronesis. And though menan's 
work is also preoccupied with this same issue, in the course 
of.his.discussion some pertinent remarks concerning Nature· 
have come up, and these merit discussion. 
51- R. Gauthier, La morale d'Arfstote, .!!!!• .£.!!., p. 44. 
See also ibid., p. 17: "Les traites de morale d'Aristote 
contiennent une anthropologie", and pp. 18, 19, 43, and 44. 
52- ~., pp. 82-4. 
53- ffio·nan, moral Knowledge, pp. 55 and 58. monan himself 
(~., p. 81) characterizes phronesis as a synthesis of 
"true reason and right desire". 
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Nature, according to monan, grounds correct moral a-
wareness in the Protrepticus. But more than ? reading of 
Nature is required to be morallt good. There is also the 
business of applying these principles formulated . ... (l'JtO 
- " ~~~ ~uaeoo~ to the concrete individual situations of pract-
ical living. This is accomplished not by a mechanical chain 
of reasoning ~ la Jaeger, but in accordance with the "es-
sentially imperfect, approximate realizations or veri~icat­
ions of such principle in concrete situations of life.n 55 
moral awareness, though derived from principles formulated 
by a study of Nature~has pr~marily to do_with their."limit-
d 1 . t. " . d . 1 1. . 56 e rea ~za ~on ~n al y 1v1ng. 
In the later Ethics, h.owever, Nature loses its import-
ance. "Nowhere in Aristotle's explicit doctrine of moral 
knowledge is nature mentioned as a pattern from which one 
could read off the goodness or badness of prospective con-
d t .. 57 uc • "More clearly than the Protrepticus, the Niche-
machean Ethics makes clear that the principles themselves 
are derived from no pre-existing metaphysically elaborated 
absolute, but from the concrete situations of life where 
alone man can realize a value~" 58 "Gone· ~s ~reality-itself'· 
and I eternal things I 11 aS the Objecf Of moral knOWlBdliB ttto 
be replaced by the contingent, individualized prakton aga-
55- menan, moral Knowledge, p. 149. 
56- menan, moral Knowledge, p. 149. 
57- menan, moral Knowledge, p. 90. 
58- menan, moral Knowledge, p. 81 • 
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59 than; a value to be realized in conduct.n 
In the later Ethics, according to Monan, the morally 
good is known pre-philosophically. It is not arrived at by 
a speculative study, nor by a philosophic study of man's 
nature, but rather by actual concrete praxis. To know what 
is morally good is possible only by doing it, and therefore 
oniy in the lived situation. 60 The norm for goodness~ than, 
is grasped in the experential and can be recognized on~y by 
one whose consistent good conduct has furnished him there-
fore with the awareness of right and wrong, i.e., by the 
h . 61 p rom.mos. It is het in fact, who becomes the locus of 
the morally right, the standard of what it is objectively 
good to do. Virtuous habituation has given him the eye to 
see immediately, without reflection or deliberation, how the 
good is to be realized in a particular instance. And ~t is 
this intuition, Monan believes, that has replaced the Pro-
treptican contemplation of Nature as·the source of our know-
ledge of right and wrong. 
59- Monan, Moral Knowledge, p. 152. 
60- This ffionan holds is true for both the Eudemian and Nich-
omachean Ethics; see Monan, moral Knowledge, pp; 144-6. -
61- Monan, moral Knowledge, p. 80; p. 152. 
CHAPTER I I 
NATURE AND THE mORAL GOOD 
A survey of the secondary literature on Aristotle's 
theory of the morally good, then, shows that the importance 
of Nature there has only been of late a topic of discussion, 
and for the most part only in ffionan's study. In a work pub-
lished the same year as Menan's, W.F.R. Hardie's Aristotle's 
. 62 Ethical Theory, it is discussed only very briefly, while 
J. Owens in a 1969 article sees it for Aristotl~ a& "convinc-
ing enough grounds for ethical universality" 63 without, how-
ever, any extended discussion as to why. What requires our 
attention, then, is an examination of how Nature a~pe~rs in 
Aristotle's ethical works and to see if. it does not take on 
a role more expansive than the previous literature allowed~ 
Accordingly, we will discuss three themes that emerge from 
this reading: (1) Nature as an agency of good; (2) the 
sense, therefore, in which Nature can be considered normat-
ive in a study of ethics, and (3) Nature and right action. 
As early as the Protrepticus, whose Platonic charact-
erization by Jaeger is, as we have seen, no longer so widely 
held, Aristotle advanced a thesis that was to appear again 
in a slightly different phrasing in the Politics: "that 
which is contrary to Nature ( ~ap4 , cpua1 v ) is ba~, -and -
62- W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory. Oxford: at 
the Clarendon Press, 1968. 
63- J. Owens, "The Grounds of Ethical Universality in Ar-
istotle .. , man and World, 2 (1969), 182-3. 
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the opposite of that which is according to Nature (xa.'t'ci 
,6aLY )." 64 Things, therefore, generated by Nature, and 
hence for an end, the Protrepticus continues, come about 
rightly or well, and also xa.A.wc; •65 Again, in the Nicho-
machean fthics: "In the world of Nature things have a nat-
66 
ural tendency to be ordered in the best possible way", a 
view fully in line with what is said about man~s end in the 
Eudemian Ethics: "by nature (,Gael ) the End .is always a 
good ••• but in contraversion to nature (na.pcl cpuar.v ), and 
by perversion, not the good but the apparent good is the, 
end. 1167 Nature, then, is a CaLise Ujhose PL!rposes are g~od, 
and whatever contravenes that purpose is not right. 68 
64- Ingemar During, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt' 
at Reconstruction. Gotebor~: Eleanders 8oktryckeri Aktie-
bolag, 1961, fragment 8 15 {hereafter simply During, Arist-
otle's Protrepticus, with the fragment number identified 
simply by 8 anc} then th2 numb~r), C f.- PQ1i tics; VII, 3, 
1325b 10-11: ouoev OE ~~Y napa. ,uatv xaKov • My reasons for 
using OGring's edition of the Protrepticus, b~ing somewhat 
lengthy, have accordingly been set forth in an Appendix (A) 
at the end of the thesis, rather than in the footnote here. 
65- OGring, Aristotle's Protrep~ticus, 8 14, _8_1_~-·-
~ .. , - "l'.. , v v , 66- Tu. XO.'tO. cpu a 1'1~ Cllt; 0 t. OY ~S XO.AA t. 0~0. &XS t. V" OU't'<sl 'lt&cpUX£V. 
The Nichomachean Ethics (hereafter f.N.); I, 9 1 1099b 20-23. 
English translation by H. Rackham in Aristotle: !..!:!! Nicho-
machean Ethics. The Loeb Classical Library. London: William 
Heinemann, 1926. 
67- Eudemian Ethics (hereafter E .E.), I I, 10, 1227a 18-23 •. 
English translation by H. Rackham in Aristotle: The Athenian 
Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues andv'ices. 
The Loeb Classical Library. London:Ulilliam H"'8Tiiemann, 1935. 
68- Politics, VII, 3, 1325b 10-11. 
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could not survive. 74 Each and every being that comes to be 
by Nature is our proof for this principle then. And it is 
reasonable to suppose that when we undertake to reason a-
bout natural things this should be on~ of our guiding 
threads. 
Such a principle would seem to have a role in ethics 
too since there our study is about the end of man who, be-
cause a natural being, has come about for an end that is· 
rightly described as his good. In three of his ethical 
tracts, in fact, Aristotle argues for a final end to human 
activity preci~ely jn_terms of the design of ~Nature~ in each_ 
case describing it as his most worthwhile good. 
In the Protrepticus it is ~povetv that is called 
his end75 because this is the excellence of his highest fac-
76 
ulty, and Nature se~ks the exc~lleriri~ of everything. 
Reasoning from the purpose of Nature we find that our end 
resides in th~ exercize or function ( M epyov ) proper to 
, 
~.POVT)O l <; , viz., cppov€tv or the attainment of 
77 truth, because 
,. 
cppOVT)Ol(; by nature ( cpuael ) is 
what last comes to be in man. And that which is. last at-
74- De Anima, III, 12, 435b 2-7. 
75- D~ring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, B 20, B 30; 8 69-70; 
cf. B 95. 
76- During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 62-67; cf. B 95. 
77- On the basis of combining B 20 with B 65 I have made 
this identification of cppove' v with the attainment . 
of truth. 
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tained in the order of a being's generation is its end ac-
cording to Nature ( xa~d # <pUCJLV ) • 78 man's end by 
nature therefore resides in the exercize of the best part 
of his soul, since it is this exercize which is the best of 
all things79 while all the other excellences of the soul 
exist for the sake of this end. 80 
In the Eudemian Ethics this theme is not so vigorously 
pursued, ·but nevertheless natural design fits into the dis-
cussion of man's good. men naturally ( # q)\.)CJ e' ) wish for 
what is good, and only contrary to nature ( napd # q>UCJ i V ) 
do they wish for something bad. 8~ nature ( ) the 
object or end, about whose means for attainment they delib-
erate, is good; and only contrary to nature ( 'ltapci. cpuaav ) 
and by perversion will one pursue the apparent, and not real, 
81 good. 
These phrases, however, "contrary to nature" and "ac-
cord~ng to nature" are not really explained in the Eudemian 
Ethics. To understand them and why they are used we must go 
to the Nichomachean Ethics. Here the Protreptican argument 
about that excellence and II epyov for which m~n's soul 
has been designed by Nature is again set forth, but now with 
certain precisions. With these the phrases 11 contrary to 
78- During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 9, 8 17. 
79- During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 20. Here the acti-
iv i ty is called cppov€1. v • 
80- DUring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 23, 8 24; cf. 8 68. 
81- f.f.., II, 10, 1227a 20-30. 
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nature" and "according to nature" as well as what is nat-
ural and what is perverse take on definite and technical 
meaning, and precisely in light of this theory of natural 
design. Along with this, then, why Aristotle uses such 
terms also becomes clear. 
In the Eudemian Ethics, just as in the Protrepticus 
and the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle had identified the 
good for man by considering what function or exercize. 
( epyov) is proper to the human soul. Unlike the doctrine 
of the Protrepticus and the Nichomachean Ethics~ however, 
he seems to have a somewhat broader understanding of the 
soul here. Since the function of the soul, according to 
the Eudemian Ethics, is to give life, and therefore also 
the function of its best state or excellence, the function 
of that excellence will be a good life, which is happiness. 
Happiness, though, is more truly an activity than a state, 
and therefore will be an activity of perfect life in accord-
ance with complete virtue ( lvepyeia xa~' ape~nv ~e-
A.dav ). 82 
The key phrase here is cipe:.,;T)v ~e'Aeiav which 
translates "complete virtue". According to J. Donald Monan 
this indicates that Aristotle conceives of happiness as in-
elusive of the whole soul. "In the E.f. ~e:A.eiav is syn-
onymous with oA.~ , i.e., perfect in the sense of entire, 
82- f.f., II, 1, 1219a 24-38. 
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composed of a variety of virtues." 83 
For this reason ffionan holds that there are two psych-
ologies operant in the Ethics. In both the Protrepticus 
and the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle had identified man 
primarily with vou' , but in the Eudemian Ethics "by impli-
catton at least, with the broader psyche"·~ 84 The Eudemian 
Ethics, in other words, is favored with a mqre "integral 
psychology ••• the psychological horizon of the f.E. has 
broadened beyond the narrow identification of man with his 
nous."
85 
Though in fact Aristotle does in both the Protrepti-
cus and the Nichomachean Ethics, but not the Eudemian f!h-
ics, speak of man as being vouc; more than anything else, 86 
monan•s conclusion that a different psychology of man is 
present in the Eudemian Ethics is not really that convinc-
ing. For to speak of the excellence of the whole soul as 
an element in happiness is in no way to suggest that man is 
not primarily vouc; • It is rather simply to assert the bas-
83- Monan, Moral Knowledge, p. 124. menan's reason for 
this identification is textual: "In the E.E. a few lines 
I ' ' 7 ~ I , - -'\ , ) ' earlier we find: e'lt.El Oe T)V ~~ euOaq.LoVla. "te"'eov "tll x.a.l eo"tt~ ~oo~ xa.t "te')..ea. xa.t ~"tEA~t; 1 xa.f ~pe"t~ &oa.u"too' (~ ~ev 
ydp o')..T), ~ Oe ~oploV, and it is the former which fiQures 




Menan, moral Knowledge, p. 126. 
I 
menan, moral Knowledge, p. 131. 
In the Protrepticus, 8 29; the I·!·' X, 7, 1178a 7. 
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ic tenet that complete happiness, and therefore the full 
excellence of the soul; can come about only when all the 
powers of the soul have come to their full excellence or 
realization. No statement about man is involved here, 
then; simply a condition of his happiness is. 
If, however, we want to know that aspect of man that 
Aristotle holds indispensable to the study of ethics we 
must know what it is that differentiates him from all other 
natural beings or, put otherwise, makes him man. for it is 
man's end that ethics seeks to define, and no other. 
Accordingly, having eliminated pleasure, honor, vir-
tue, and the Good of the Platonists as man's end, 87 Arist-
otle in the Nichomachean Ethics turns to examine what the 
final end of all human action is, and how it can be attained 
by man. All properly human acts, acts done knowingly and 
with purpose, he points out, are done on account of a~ ~nd 
that is apprehended as desirable. Some ends, however, are 
more final than others, some ends really being means to a 
further end. For example, though the purpose of working is 
remuneration, this is not an end in itself. Rather, it be-
comes a means for support and sustenance and is therefore 
by no means something final. Only what is not a means to 
something else, but is an end chosen exclusively for its own 
sake, is absolutely fina1. 88 
And in the order of human action this end is happi• 
87- f..~., I, 3-6, 1095a 1 - 97a 15. 
88- E.N., I, 7, fb97a 26-34. 
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, since we always choose it for its own 
sake, and never as a means to something else. Once it has 
been attained, desire for anything further ceases. Happi-
ness by itself is alone sufficient to render life desirable, 
and any effort needed for its attainment worth the while. 
Thus it is happiness which is the end of all human action, 
89 happiness which is man's complete good. 
Something is completely goad, however, only when that 
function ( ~pyov ) proper to it is exercized. Its perfect-
ion lies in mare than the mere possession of such a funct-
ian. Far example, the complete goad of flute playing, Ar-
istotle points aut, consists not merely in the ability to 
play the flute well, but in the actual good playing of it. 
Tharefore, since happiness is man's complete goad, then 
what the proper function of man is must be determined so that 
we may find haw happiness comes about. And being man's com-
plate good, it too will reside in some sort of exercize, 
and not just a possession or patency. 90 
To locate something's complete goad, then, requires 
that its characteristic function be identified, since its 
specific good entails the actual exercize or it. And that 
man has such a function, Aristotle paints out, seems clear 
enough from the fact that each class or man does (e.g., the 
cobbler's is to make good shoes, the teacher's to instruct 
well), as do even his bodily parts. llie can assume then that 
89- f.N., I, 7, 1097a 34- b 20. 
90- f.~., I, 7, 1097b 22- 27. 
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man has a function unique to him, and for this, Aristotle 
, 91 
explicitly says, he has been designed ~e~uxev , by nature. 
And it is reason (Aoyo~ ) that is this function since 
this alone differentiates him and makes him unique from all 
other organic life, and is alone that in virtue of which 
human life can be called happy. 92 The life proper to man is 
one which functions according to reason. And hence the good 
proper to him will be an activity in accord with reason, or 
more specifically its excellence. 
Hence, for Aristotle to show how man's end is to be 
attained we must know that characteristic function for which 
91- E.N., I, 7, 1097b 30-35. The line of reasoning here 
is: if-Nature has ordained even the most insignificant parts 
of the human body to do a certain work, ~ fortiori it has 
man, for he is far nobler than these. ~~uxev ,. of course, 
is the key word here. Rackham (p. 31 of his translation of 
the I·!:!·' .Q.E• cit.), J.A.K. Thompson (p. 38 of his, I!:!! 
Ethics of Aristotle. London: Penguin Books, 1959), Ostwald 
{p. 16 of his, Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics. New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962)t and Tricot (p. 57, Ethique a Nicomague. 
Paris: J. Vrin, 1959) give it the force of natural or by 
nature, while RobS (p. 942 in !hg Basic Works of Aristotle, 
R. McKeon (ed.). New York: Random House, 1941~and Dirlmeier 
(p. 14, Nikomachische Ethik. Berlin: Akadamie-Uerlag, 1956) 
give it the meaning of being born with. liddell-Scott (p. 
773, Greek Lexicon. London: Oxford, 1974, Abridged Edition) 
allows for its translating as "the nature" or "naturally", 
and this is certainly both a permissible and accurate trans-
lation here. This is clear from£.£., .II, B, 1224b 32-34: 
"the two marks by which we define the natural (-ro ~6o~a "-
which can also translate as "that which is by nature"-) "-
it is that which is found with us as soon as we are born, or 
that which comes to us if growth is allowed to proceed regu-
larly, e.g., grey hair, old age, and so on;" Engli'h trans-
lation by J. Solomon in The Works of Aristotle Translated 
Into English, w.o. Ross TS'd.). London: Oxford, 1966, Vol.-
~ Cf. During, Aristotle's Protrepticus' 8 16, where Ar-
istotle says man has come into being ~3oel and xa-rd ~UOlV.; 
and 8 23: man is by nature (~6aea ) composed of body and 
soul. · 
92- I•!:!•, I, 7, 1098a 1-20. 
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he has been designed by nature; for it is in the excellence 
of this function that his end consists. And for Aristotle 
we have seen that man has been designed by Nature to live in 
accordance with reason, and that by so living he brings a-
bout his own well-being. 
Ethics, then, requires a knowledge of the nature of 
man; it has an anthropological tenor. The statesman, in 
fact, is said to need this knowledge since ethics is most 
properly political in scope, its area of concern being in-
' 
eluded in and subordinated to politics, the master science. 93 
If the lawmaker's task is to make his fellow-citizens good, 
he must have an understanding of man's soul, since only in 
this way can he know the end for which Nature has brought 
him to be. In so understanding the soul, then, he will be 
able to promote their happiness and well-being, or guide 
them in that life which arises from reason. 94 
The significance of this line of reasoning emerges far 
more forcefully in Book X with Aristotle's identification of 
man wi :th vout; • It is because man is especially vout; that 
~~ dvepw~~ a~ 6 xa~d ~~v vouv ~Cot;, efnep ~ou~o ~dALO~«. 
4vepoonot; since, as had already been established,~o ~p·o~5 x.eLov £xcia~4l -til cpuael xpci~lo~ov xat Tja,o~ov !a~Lv £x&.cn(tl. 
-
93- I·~·• I, 2-4, 1094a 18- 95b 11. 
94- I·~·' I, 13, 1102a 7-24. 
95- E.N., X, 7, 1178a 5-8• English translation (Rackham): 
first-part-- "the life of the intellect is the best and most 
pleasant for man"; second part-- .. that which is best and . 
most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to 
the nature of each." 
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Human happiness therefore, properly speaking, consists in 
the best activity of the intellect, and thus that which is 
the excellence of the best part in us. 
It is for this reason that Aristotle has. shifted the 
first book's emphasis from )..oyo~ as man's specific differ-
ence to vouc; now in Book x. Nouc; , as that which is 
best in man, is what identifies him most truly since each 
thing is defined by its en d96 and that which is best in a 
thing is most truly its end. Eudaimonia, then, will only 
come about through the excellence of that which is best in 
man, viz.' vouc; • And as that activity in accord with 
such excellence it will be his best good. 
Nouc; , however, as being man's best end, is so by 
nature since in the generation of natural beings the end is 
97 by nature. Therefore that good which is best for man, 
viz., eudaimonia, is by natural design. And as that for 
which all human action takes place, eudaimonia is most sat-
isfying when the intellect has reached its excellence, viz., 
contemplative activity. This is most truly its good, as 
well as our most pleasant state. 
Thus, for Aristotle, "in man rational principia 
( A.oyo~ ) and mind ( vouc; ) are the end towards which nat-
)",98 the excellence of 
96- E.N., III, 7, 1115b 23. 
97- On this see D~ring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 6_13, 
B 15. 
98- Politics, VII, 15, 1334b 14-16. English translation by 
B. Jowett in the Basic Works of Aristotle, .2£• ill• 
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which brings about happiness, our best good. Anything de-
tractibg from this end or good, therefore, goes contrary to 
Nature; anything contributing to it is in accordance with 
Nature. 
We have then the reason for and meanings of what Ar-
istotle understands by the natural and unnatual in regard 
to human conduct. If our end is something good and attain-
able through our own agency, then whatever choice-motivated 
conduct befits that end is morally good, while what does not 
is morally bad. The end and good of man, however, is by 
natural design. And therefore the morally good turns out 
to be what is according to Nature, while the morally bad is 
what perverts or contravenes Nature. 
To be morally good for Aristotle, then, is to fit into 
the design of Nature, to act in accordance with its plan. 
Things that are done rightly, therefore, are done according 
to Nature, while the "wicked man is contrary to nature 
( na.pd. <pOOlV )." 99 Accordingly, moral goodness and man's 
end by nature converge: whatever is morally good accords 
with it, while whatever accords with that end is morally 
good. 
Such is the sense and sigpificance of natural and un-
natural in Aristotle's ethical terminology. Convinced of the 
goodness of the natural design and thus of the goodness of 
man's end he is therefore able to ascribe value to human 
99- E.f., VII, 6, 1240b 20-21. English translation by H. 
Rackham in Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution, The Eudem-
ian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices, ~· cit. 
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acts in light of that design. Clearly, then, Nature has 
significance in the study of human conduct for Aristotle. 
As that which has fashioned man's end, its design is there-
fore for him the criterion and norm by which the ethician 
.can speak of the goodness and badness of human acts. 
And it is only in this sense that it is normative. 
Natural design does not serve as a landmark for the man im-
mersed in daily living. He does not look "with an eye to 
Nature" to see whether and how he should or should not act 
in a certain circumstance. Rather, experience wi~l provide 
the eye and, as such, to the good man for seeing what the 
good to be done in such matters is, an experience, however, 
based on habituation to good action. 100 for the good man 
this habituation is the fabric of moral knowledge. It is 
the habituation of choosing rightly by one reared in virtu-
ous conduct and correct instruction, and who has thereby 
101 come to grasp the principles of right and wrong, as well 
as what the true good of human action is.102 
This, ~n other terms, is the phronimos. He has acq-
uired the excellence of practical reasoning, that good 
100- f.~., VI, 12, 1144a 29-31. 
101- E.N., I, 4, 1095b 4-13; II, 1, 1103a 14-16; X,. 9, 
1179b 21~27; VII, 8, 1151a 15-19. Aristotle speaks of the 
apprehension of these particulars as coming by way of in-
duction from particular situations, and thus culminating iri 
an immediate intuitive grasp; cf. f.fl., I, 7, 1098b 2-4; VI, 
3, 1139b 26-31; VI, 11, 1143b 3-5, and Analytica Posteriora, 
II, 19. 
102- £.~.,VI, 11, 1143a 33-35. 
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moral reasoning which concludes in right action,103 and is 
set forth by Aristotle as our canon for good living.104 His 
virtue, being the mark of right reason, 105 is the test of 
all human actions as to their goodness or badness. 
Nevertheless, even here we may say that Nature is, op-
erant, if only in the background, for Aristotle. That which 
is right, we have seen, is what accords with Nature. A 
reason that i~ right, then, will be one that accords with 
Nature, i.e., one whose aims and directives parallel Nat-
103- We must be very clear on this point. For Aristotle, 
the practical syllogism does not precede action; rather, it 
culminates in it. "In a practical syllogism the major pre-
mis is an opinion, while the minor premis deal with part-
icular things, which are the province of perception. Now 
when the two premises are combined, just as in theoretic 
reasoning the mind is compelled to affirm the resulting con-
clusion, so in the case of practical premises you are 
forced to do it. For example, given the premises 'All -
sweet things ought to be tasted 1 and 'Yonder thing is 
sweet•-- a particular instance of the general class, you are 
bound, if able and not prevented, immediately ( !~a ) to 
taste the thing", E.N., VIII, 3, 1147a 25-32. English tran-
slation by H. Rackham in Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethips, 
.QE• cit. Cf. De Anima, III, 11, 434a 16-21; and De Motu 
AnimaTium, I, 6=7. Here Aristotle tells us that Tn regard 
to reasoning about things to be done our "two premises re-
sult in a conclusion which is an action ••• it is clear that 
the action is a conclusion." English translation by A.s.L. 
Farquharson in ~ Works of Aristotle Translated Into ~­
.!l!ill' ..Q£• .£!!., 1912, Vol. 5. Also, I•!!•t VII, 9, 1152a 
7-10: "Prudence does not consist only in knowing what is 
right, but also in doing it". English translation by H. 
Rackham in Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics, .QE• cit. 
104- Actually, Aristotle says the good man is "as it were" 
( OO'litp ) the standard of the noble and pleasant, f..•.!:!•t 
III, 4, 1113a 32-35. But in the Protrepticus (During, Ar-
istotle's Protrepticus, 8 39) he is called the xav~v -or 
what is good since when his choice follows his knowledge the 
things that he chooses are good, and their contraries avi~. 
Presumably, though not stated here, this knowledge (here, 
!1tLO'tWTJ ) is both of Nature and things eternal. 
105- f...~., VI, 13, 1144b 24-25. 
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ure's. Phronesis, then, as the virtue of acting rightly 
from a reason that is right, is how human action best par-
allels Nature. And since it is the virtue of the good man, 
the good man in acting rightly and doing what is good can 
quite accurately be described for Aristotle as one who acts 
as_jature does. more to the point, in doirig what is good 
and thus sustaining his own well-being, he is co-operating 
with Nature for it is at such a good that Nature has aimed 
for man. 
Curiously enough, however, Aristotle obliges rulers 
and statesmen to pay heed to Nature, not to the phronimos, 
in their ruling of men. In the Protrepticus it is held that 
the statesman must have certain landmarks taken from 
Nature and truth itself (a~o ~~~ ~uoew~ au~~~ 
xal ~~~ 4A~9eia~ ) by reference to which he will 
judge what is just, what is good, and what is expedient 
••• the best vo~o~ is that which is planted in the 
greatest possible conformity with Nature ( x.a~cl 
~UOlV ). 106 
And in the Nichomachean Ethics, as we saw, the statesman 
must have a knowledge of man's soul and the end for which 
he has been designed by Nature, since his duty is to effect 
the excellence and well-being of the populace. 
Perhaps the underlying reason here is that if in the 
community of Nature things, unless prevented, are always 
brought naturally to their good ·and are ordered in the best 
possible way, the statesman has much to gain from the study 
of Nature in his attempt to do the same for society. If so._ 
106- D~ring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 47. See also 
ibid., 8 46: "Good lawmakers too must have a general know-
ledge of nature ( ~iic; cpuoewc; ) • " 
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then Nature becomes mo~e than a criterion for the moral 
value of human acts. It is now a source of enlightenment 
for the correct and good direction of the state as well. 
CHAPTER III 
NATURE AND MORAL HABIT 
In Nature then, according to ~ristotle, whatever comes 
to be does so for its own characteristic good, and by natur-
al design. Nature's workmanship is throughout teleological, 
ordering all things to their proper completion and fulfill-
ment. On different levels, however, this is accomplished 
in-different ways. In those things lacking knowledge and 
hence awareness of their end we are wont to attribute the 
attainment of their end, Aristotle points out, exclusively 
to the agency of Nature. The seed becomes a plant, the 
fawn a deer, "the swallow makes its nest and the spider its 
web"- all instances of the teleological direction of natur-
al processes, all of which, however, occur without any deli-
beration or conscious seeking. It is by Nature that this _ 
occurs, Nature which is the cause. 107 
The relation of man, however, to his end differs. It 
is nobler than those on the levels of life below him for it 
involves a life according to reason. With man action for 
an end involves the knowledge that it is good, the subse-
quent wishing for it, and the conscious deliberation about 
the means to attain ito Comparing and evaluating the means 
or actions possible for a given end he can then decide as 
to their suitability and choose accordingly-- all of which 
107- Physics, II, 8, 199a 20-30. 
108- E.N., III, 3, 1113a 4-14. 
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is absent in the leves of life below him.109 
Thus, in man while some processes are solely under 
natural control, e.g., aging and dying, 110 others are not. 
These are the actions which his choice initiates-- actions 
1 1 1 
over which he has control, of which he is the efficient 
and conscious final cause, 112 and hence for which he is held 
responsible. They are done knowingly and from purpose for 
an attainable end after deliberation has shown the course 
of action best suited to that end, and with full awareness 
of all the circumstances involved. These being the condi-
tions for ascribing responsibility for an action are also, 
therefore, the conditions for praise and blame. 113 They 
thereby also merit the attribution of virtuous and vicious,~ 
when such actions have become a matter of habit, since the 
excellence or depravity of one's character are objects of 
. bl 114 pra~se or ame. 
109- £.N., III, 2, 1111b 10-13. Children, too, are includ-
ed here for they lack experience and hence the knowledge and 
ability to judge things adequatelyo Cf. f.f., II, 10, 
1225b 26-27; II, 10, 1226b 21-22. 
110- f.N., V, B, 1135a 34- b 1o 
111- E.N., III, 3, 1113a 10-12. Cf. f.E., II, 10, 1225b 
36-38 and II, 10, 1226b 34-35. 
112- £.N., III~ 5, 1113b 17 and VII, 8, 1151a 16. Cf. E.f., 
IIi 6, 1222b 18-20. 
113- f.N., III, 1-5, 1109b 30 - 1114b 25. 
114- E.N., 1!, 5, 1105b 29-32; cf. f.£., VII, 15, 1249a 26; 
II, 6,-1Z23a 9-11. 
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Virtue and vice, than, are a matter of choice; 115 it 
116 is through our own agency that they come about. Thus 
• 
moral virtue or vice, the habits of our appetitive powers, 
is something that is our own responsibility. 
On this point Aristotle is clear. Of themselves the 
appetitive powers are morally neutral. It is only by hab-
ituation, repeatedly choosing or acting in the same way, 
that they take on a moral value and become states of char-
acter. No one therefore can be born morally virtuous or 
vicious; rather man is by nature pre-mora1. 117 
That this is the case Aristotle makes clear in the 
Nichomachean Ethics by contrasting Nature and habit. (1) 
Whatever is by Nature cannot be altered while the appetit-
ive powers can be, depending on their degree of habituation 
as well as that towards which they have been habituated. 
(2) The faculties, which are in us by Nature, do not arise 
from habituation. for example, it is not through repeated 
115- E._N., II, 5, 1106a 3-4; VI, 12, 1144a 19; II, 6, 
1106b 36. Cf. f.f., II, 6, 1223a 17-20: Virtue and vice, be-
ing voluntary, are done from deliberate choice; and III, 1, 
1230a 27: "All virtue implies deliberate choice." (English 
tr~nslation by J. Solomon in The Works of Aristotle Translat-
ed Into English, .Q.E• cit., 1966, Vol. r'x:) 
116- f.~., III, 5, 1113b 3-20; III, 5, 1114b 22-25; cf. 
E.E., II, 6, 1222b 17-19; II, 6, 1223a 1-16. 
117- E.N., II, 1, 1103a 14- 1103b 22; cf. Magna ffioralia 
(hereaftir m.m.), I, 6, 1186a 3-8. We should. note that 
though the authorship of the m.m. is debated, we will never-
theless refer to it. for our topic covers the Aristotelian 
ethics, and the m.m. has always been allowed a place in the 
Aristotelian corpus. · · 
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acts of seeing that one has the faculty of sight; rather, 
first one has the faculty and then sees because of it. {3) 
The appetitive powers, finally, can admit of contrary habits, 
viz., virtue or vice, while that which is by Nature is in-
capable of contraries. 118 
Our moral habits, then, are not in us by nature; by 
nature we are indifferently disposed towards them. These 
states of character, according to Aristotle, come about only 
through repeated acts and practice, 119 and are strictly the 
results of human agency. 
Instruction, however, is also essential here. for ~x-
ample, in the case of moral virtue it would seem, Aristotle 
suggests, to require the instruction of one who already 
knows from experience what the correct and excellent thing 
to do is. 12° For just as it is unlikely that one could get 
to a certain destination without first knowing where it is, 
so also it would seem unlikely that one would do the right 
thing without first knowing what it is. 
Of equal importance is Aristotle's tenet that to be 
morally virtuous requires practice. Here virtue is likened 
118- For these contrasts see£.~., II, 1, 1103a 19- b 22; 
cf. f.E., VII, 14, 1247a 31-33; II, 2, 1230b 3-4; VII, 2, 
12~8a l0-11~ The argument also appears, but in a less pre-
cise form, in the ~.ffi., I, 6, 1186a 2-8. 
119- Politics, VIII, 1, 1337a 19-20 and E.N., II, 1, 1103b 
14-18. See too Rhetoric, I, 11, 1370a 6-' where Aristotle 
says that whatever has been habituated becomes, as it were, 
natural; also On memory ~ Reminiscence, 2, 452a 30 and . 
f.N., X, 9, 1180a 1. 
120- £.~.,II, 1, 1103b 2-18. 
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to excellence in a ctaft. As the cobblert for instance, 
gains ease with and becomes better at his craft through 
practice, so also repetition in doing what is right makes 
it easier to do and one more virtuous. Just as one learns 
a craft by actually working at it, e.g., men become build-
ers by buiding houses, so one becomes virtuous by actually 
-- 121 doing virtuous acts. 
Unlike the crafts, however, where the good done lies 
in the product and not the agent, the excellence that vir-
tuous habituation brings about remains in the agent. 122 The 
virtues, in other words, are principles of action perfective. 
of the agent such that the good of a virtuous action is 
identical with the agent himself. 
Hence, that an act be virtuous, it is not enough that 
it be performed virtuously. The agent himself must be vir-
tuous. (i-n addition to instruction and practice, thent vir-
1. 
tue requires that its agent have knowledge of what is right 
and what he is doing. And that what he does be done from a 
permanent state of character, out of deliberate choice, and 
for its own sake] An action then, though it may appear vir-
tuous; is so only when the one performing it is. And this 
is not possible unless all the conditions for virtue have 
been met. 123 
121- E•.!::!•t II, 1, 1103a 14- b 26; cf. E.~., II, 4, 1105a 
18-19; II, 4, 1105b 9-13; and E.E., II, 2, 1220a 38- b 6. 
122- £•!•' II, 4, 1105a 27 - b 4. 
123- !·~·'II, 4, 1105a 28-34. 
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The moral habits, therefore, according to Aristotle 
are not in us by Nature. They come about through the agency 
of our choice, 124 on how we have chosen to habituate our-
selves, and in light of how we have been trained and in-
structed. What is ours by N~ture in this case are those 
powers that are to be habituated to right or wrong, as well 
as the natural propensities we might have to some virtues or 
125 
vices which could make this habituation more or less easy. 
In the case of propensities towards vice, however, this would 
more accurately be characterized as defects in nature, rather 
than the result of it. Thus, e.g., Aristotle characterizes 
the tendency to be frightened by everything, "even the sound 
of a mouse 11 , as beneath the human, and the enjoyment of un-
natural pleasures, whether by habit or natural depravity, as 
b t . 1 126 es 1a • 
The propensity towards good habituation, on the other 
hand, is characterized as a natural virtue ( ~ua'x~ 4-
pe~~),127 and is a division of virtue that appears in the 
Eude~ian Ethics, Nichomachean Ethics, and Magna Moralia. 128 
124- E.N., VI, 1, 1139a 31-32. 
125- [.H., II, 1, 1103a 24-25. 
126- See£.~., VII, 5, 1149a 8-9 and VII, 5, 1148b 17-24; 
also VII, 5, 1149a 10-11. 
127- m.m. I, 34, 1198a 4, II, 3, 1199b 37-38~ 
128- In the m.m. at I, 34, 1197b 36- 1198a 21 and II, 3, 
1199b 37- 1200a 5; the E.£., II, 1, 1220a 10-11, III, 7, 
1234a 24-32; the f·H•t VI, 13, 1144b 2-17 and VI, 13, 
1144b 33 - 1145a 2. 
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The theory that is set forth in these is that a natural 
virtue is a disposition for a certain virtue, but exists 
apart from reason and choice. It is not something that we 
have by our own effort but rather by nature. Such propen-
sities, then, are not virtues in the true or full sense, 
but rather capacities that, when under the right guidance 
and correct habituation, become principles of action that 
are chosen in accord with reason. They are, Aristotle points 
out, related to the true virtues in the same way cleverness 
is to prudence. Cleverness is the natural ability of siz-
ing things up quickly for one's advantage and acting accord-
ingly. Prudence, too, is acting in accord with this immed-
iate grasp of a situation, but now in line with the good 
that is directly perceived there. Here one's motivation 
is not personal advantage but the right to be done. And 
this because in prudence reason is right and the directive 
of what is good. The formation of this reason, however, re-
quires proper instruction and experience, while cleverness 
requires neither. If one is possessed of it, however~ with 
proper instruction and habituation acquiring this reason 
comes about much more easily and quickly. 129 
Thus there are natural tendencies in us to certain 
virtues. Some are friendlier or more temperate in nature 
than others, while others seem able to endur~ more hardship 
or pain. These good natural qualities, however, are merely 
starts in the right direction. They become habits of excel• 
129- f.N., VI, 13, 1144b 2-17; and VII, 8, 1151a 23-25. 
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lence only through practice and choice, after proper guid-
ance. 
Though we may be naturally endowed, then, with certain 
good qualities, if we are to be virtuous it is our business 
to choose in accordance with the good instructio~ given us 
so that these qualities can be fully perfected. Only by so 
choosing can we become grounded in good ways of acting such 
that they become part and parcel of our makeup. By always 
act~ng in accord with this right choice, desiring only what 
is right because our knowledge tells us it is so, we forge 
a personality and character that is praised for its virtue. 
Our natural good qualities develop into permanent states of 
right character, states whose excellence we oursel~e~ have 
brought about. 
Thus, though we be naturally endowed with these good 
qualities, this does not suffice to make us good. For Arist-
otle a truly virtuous character also requires the individual's 
own intention to be good, and rightly acting so that he does 
become good. Habituation to what is right, therefore, be-
comes all-important in character building. Only in this way 
can one appreciate what is good and become readily adept at 
doing it. 
What we have then by nature are certain potencies, cer-
tain inborn capacities, for moral excellence that become 
virtuous states through choice and habit. Of themselves, 
therefore, the natural virtues are incomplete. Virtue in 
the true sense is a fixed disposition for doing what is good, 
41 
and not m~rely an inclination or propensity for it. Virtue 
in the true sense, therefore, completes natural v~rtue, 
brings to completion what is at first only an aptitude for 
excellence. The good development of these propensities for 
Aristotle calls for the individual's decision who, if 
schooled and trained in the right way, will much more readily 
diseover the good sense of his decision than one who has not 
had these benefits. 
We see then that for Aristotle the development of good 
capacities is not so simple a task. Required for its success 
are Nature, the discipline and instruction of one already 
well-practiced in virtue, the habituation, then, in line 
with what is right, and the receptivity and willingness to 
learn of the one being trained. All four must be present 
and in harmony with one another before any positive result 
can come about. 130 
Thus, in his theory of moral habits Aristotle has seen 
reason to discuss Nature from two points of view. moral 
virtue and vice are not inborn; we do not have them by nat-
ure, but rather through our own agency. Virtue and vice 
are things within our power and become permanent disposit-
• ions of the soul through our repeated choice. Where choice 
is in accord with the right rule virtue comes about; when in 
conflict, vice. 
A corollary to this, then, is th~t happiness is not 
ours by nature. For this consists in excellence of soul,. 
130- Politics, VII, 13, 1332a 40- b 7. 
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and that "depends on the individual and his personal acts 
being of a certain character. 11131 
What we do have, though, by way of natural endowment 
are certain givens-- certain capacities waiting to be tapped 
and brought to their proper excellence by the presence and 
co-operation of our other three conditions mentioned above. 
They are starts in the right direction, and this accounts 
for their importance in good character formation. Like our 
other three conditions, if these capacities are not there, 
it is difficult to see how one could become morally good. 
They seem well-nigh indispensable, in fact, which is evidence 
enough again to show the significance of Nature in Arist-
otle's ethical theory. 
131- E.E., I, 3, 1215a 15-17. English translation by J. 
Solomon In The Works of Aristotle Translated Into English, 
~· cit. 
CHAPTER IV 
VIRTUE AS AN ImiTATION OF NATURE 
True virtue for Aristotle is, we have seen, a perfect-
ion of the individual agent. In the moral sphere it is that 
state in which the passions are moderated through the di-
rective of reason, disposing the agent therefore to act in 
the best possible way with regard to them. 132 Reason, as 
Ari~totle insists, is inherent to moral virtue, then, since 
it is only through reason that we can choose what is right, 
the distinguishing mark of all moral virtue. It is by this 
rectitude of choice that moral virtues arise, at the same 
time sustaining and sharpening reason's perception of what 
is right as well as perfecting the desire for what is good. 
It is such qualities of soul that are the character-
istics of virtuous men, and by which life is maintained in 
the best possible way. The benefit of reason upon the 
passions, in other words, is that its directives there pro-
vide for our overall well-being. As the rule by which we 
avoid the harms that excess and defect bring its observance, 
e.g., keeps us in sound physical condition, as in the case 
of temperance and good temper or, in the case of courage, 
correctly aware of what it is right to endure for the sake 
. 133 
of the noble. In all elements of the moral sphere it is 
132- £.!., II, 6, 1106b 36- 1107a 8~ cr. m.m., I, 7-a, 
1186a 20-33; I, 9, 1186b 33-36, II, 10, 1208a ~-21; E.E., 
II, 3, 1220b 32-33; and Politics, IV, 11, 1295a 37-3~.-
133- See E.N., II, 2, 1104a 12-20; II, 3, 1104b 27-36; II, 
6 1 1106b 18-27; IV, 5, 1125b 26- 1126a 31, and III, 6, 1115a 7 - 1116a 15. 
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the reasonable, that which is right, that advances what is 
best134 and, as Aristotle notes, what evokes the admiration 
and encouragement of others. 
Living well, then, is secured through a reason that is 
open to and appreciative of what is inherently good. It is 
the guage for what is right in each circumstance, the right 
rule for good living. In fact, through good living Aristotle 
holds such a rule becomes a habit of mind, 135 th~ skill of 
perceiving directly the right thing to be done in a given 
circumstance. Such acuity of thought is the excellence of 
practical reasoning, the fixed disposition of intellect by 
which actions productive of our well-being are brought a-
bout.136 It is knowledge infallibly directive of the good 
137 to be done, and precisely because this is what it is 
right to do. 
We have here, then, some parallels to Nature's opera-
tions. Nature, as we saw, is for Aristotle an agency of 
134- E.E., II, 5, 1222a 6-10: "Virtue is that sort of habit 
from which men have a tendency to do the best actions, and 
through which they are in the best disposition towards what 
is best; and the best is what is in accordance with right 
reason, and this is the mean between excess and defect rel-
ative to us." English translation by J. Solomon in The 
Works of Aristotle Jranslated Into English, £E• cit.---
135- This is a clear enough inference from the fact that for 
Aristotle "practical wisdom is a right rule" about things to 
be done in human conduct (f.~., VI, 13, 1144b 26-29) and, as 
we have seen, arises through habits rightly formed. 
136~ E.!·~ VI, 5, 1140a 24-28; VI, 5, 1140b 8-10; 
137- E.N., VI, &, 1141a 3-5. 
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good. It always brings the best to pass, prescribing ends 
such that things are ordered in the best possible way. 
These ends, furthermore, are the proper good of natural 
things and the perfection of their coming to be. It is 
Nature which provides in this coming to be for the har~ony 
and good organization of all bodily parts and functions. 138 
.-
as well as the balance and regularity needed to preserve 
the various levels of life at large. 
In the moral sphere, however, we saw that it is reason, 
the rational principle, that accounts for the good disposi-
tion of the passions. By bringing them in line with what 
is good, it effects an equilibrium among them in much the 
same way Nature does among the bodily parts. And as this 
equilibrium that Nature ordains advances and sustains the 
organism's well-being, so also does the directive of reason. 
Each of the passions brought to its proper good contributes 
to the general well-being of the whole man. 139 
Right reason, then, is for Aristotle an agency of 
good. Like Nature it "is on the lookout for what is best", 
urging us "aright and towards the best objects".140 And as 
a habit of mind it is a permanent disposition towards such 
things, just as Nature is a permanent principle of good in 
138- Qg Generations Animalium, II, 4, 740b 26 - 741a 3. 
139- for a detailed informative discussion 6n the parallels 
for Aristotle between bodily and moral excellences see Theo-
dore J. Tracy, Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of ~ 
~ ln Pl~to and Aristotle. Chicago: Loyola University · 
Press, 1969, pp. 227-61. 
140- See m • .ffi., II, 2, 1199a 10-11 and f.N., I, 13, 1102b 
16-17. 
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the world. This permanent disposition, however, is the 
virtue of the morally good man, making obvious the analogy: 
what Nature accomplishes on a large scale, the good man ac-
complishes on the small scale in his own life. He, there-
fore, will act rightly, for "nothing contrary to Nature is 
right", do what is best since this is what Nature does, and 
thereby promote his own well-being, which is in line with 
the design of Nature. 
The morally good man, though, the one wise in practical 
matters, has all the other moral virtues. 141 Because he 
habitually acts rightly, in each circumstance he will there-
fore display the appropriate moral virtue. This, however, 
he can do only if he acts from a knowledge that is right, 
is, in other words, possessed of practical wisdom. Pract-
ical wisdom and the other moral virtues go hand in hand, 
the presence of one implying that of the other. 
These virtues, however, whose full integration signi-
fies complete excellence of character, are all the best 
states of the appropriate powers of the sou1.142 They bring 
these into good condition and enable each faculty, thereby, 
to do its work we11. 143 That function, in other words, for 
which each power has been designed is best accomplished only 
when that power has been perfected. 
Virtuous states, then, as the best conditions of the 
141- f..£!., VI, 1:S,_ 1145a 1-2. 
142- f..N., VI, 1, 1139a 15-16; m.m., I, 4, 1185a 36-39. 
143- f..N., II, 6, 1106a 15-20. 
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soul are really states that accord with Nature. For only 
what is best can accord with Nature, and clearly these 
states are what is best in man. The moral virtues, there-
fore, accord with man's end, for this is by Nature. Man, 
therefore, in being morally virtuous is following the de-
si9~ of Nature. Put otherwise, to be good is natural to 
man; is that towards which his nature inclj~es, and is that 
which completes his nature when he has become fully virtu-
ous. 
This fullness of virtue, however, goes beyond simply 
excellence of character. As the appetitive powers have 
their perfections, so also, Aristotle .. holds, do the intel-
lectual. We have already seen this in the case of phrenes-
is, that true and reasoned capacity, infused with right de-
sire, about the things that are good and bad for man. 144 
Correspondingly, the excellence of the scientific faculty 
is truth about things necessary, eternal, and which cannot 
be otherwise. Art reasons truly about things to be made, 
and makes them well. Nou' is the excellence of grasping 
the indemonstrable principles of science, while philosophy 
is the union of vou' and science, i.e., the knowledge of 
first principles and what necessarily follows from them 
144- E.fl., VI, 5, 1140b 1-6 and VI, 5~ 1140b 20-21; also 
VI, 2, 1139a 29-31. 
. 145 in demonstrations. · 
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Each one of these excellences is a fixed disposition 
of soul, a perfected habit of mind, that has been effected 
. th b . t t. 146 . th f - . e~ er y ~ns rue ~on or, ~n e case o vou' , exper-
ience. None of these habits, though, Aristotle holds, could 
have arisen unless the passions had in some degree already 
been moderated.147 Left to excess or defect, they would do 
violence to both body and soul, causing all forms of con-
flict and stress. It is only when they are in a good condi-
tion that the higher functions of the soul can be carried 
out, making their excellence indispensable to intellective 
activity. 
The highest of our intellective activities, however, 
is contemplation. It is what is most proper to us, and 
145- For this classification of the excellences of the 
soul's cognitive powers see~.~., VI, 2-7, 1139a 26 -
1141a 19. llie should note, too, the parallel function of 
vou' in the strictly theoretical sphere to its function in 
the practical sphere. In both cases Aristotle assigns to 
it the role of immediate, non-discursive, apprehension--
it therefore serving as the starting-point of both theoret-
ical and practical reasoning. On this also see footnote 
101, page ~9, of this thesis. 
146- f·li·• II, 1, 1103a 15-16. 
147- This is either implicit in or directly expressed at 
f.N., III, 11, 1118b 22- 1119a 18; VII; 9, 1151b 4-11; VII, 
7, 1150a 9-13; VII, 10, 1152a 15-16; VII, 8, 1151a 20-28; 
II, 6, 1106b 17-22; and ffi•ill•• II, 10, 1208a 9-21. Here Ar-
istotle holds that "to act ••• in accordance with right reas-
.. , ~ "\ ... 
on (xet't'd 't'OV opeov AOyov ) is when the irrational part of 
the soul does not prevent the rational part from displaying 
it:s own activity", i.e., "when ••• the passions do not hinder 
the mind from performing its own work, then you will have 
what is done in accordance with right reason." English 
translation by St. George Stock in The Works of Aristotle 
Translated Into English, £E• cit., 1966, Vol.-rx~ 
49 
whose continuous activity constitutes our best good~ Its 
merits are large, being the most pleasant of all things, 
fully self-sufficient, complete in itself, and most like 
divine life. It makes the virtuous attainment of all the 
other faculties of soul well worthwhile, and can come about 
on~~ when their excel~ences have been achieved. Contemplat-
ion, then, is a rare good and thus its pos$~ssion highly 
. d 148 prl.ze • 
For those, however, who have achieved all the other 
excellences of soul contemplation can be realized and, when 
realized, so also their complete perfection. With contemp-
lation every power of soul is in its best state, and the 
life of virtue therefore complete. 
But, we have seen, such perfection is precisely what 
Nature had intended for man. It has ordained him for only 
what is best, which in man is a completely virtuous life. 
Inasmuch, then, as man is virtuous he imitates Nature~ for 
through virtue he attains and does what is best. Virtue 
emerges then as man's completed natural state; and in this 
sense, therefore, we can say that for Arist6tle a completely 
good life would be a life complete in accord with Nature. 
148- See £.N., X, 7, 1177a 11-28 and X, 7, 1177b 18-26~ 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Life according to Nature, then, is what brings about 
man's best good. Good habituation and instruction accompan-
ied by reason all serve to bring about that for which Nature 
has designed us. Natural propensities, too, are an aid in 
this, completing our enumeration of those factors essential 
to the fully virtuous life. 
Contemplation, however, as that for which man has been 
designed by Nature is, for Aristotle, the closest natural 
t . . t t. d. . 1" f 149 Th t 1 t. beings come o 1m1 a 1ng 1v1ne 1 e. e con emp a 1ve 
man, therefore, is the fifiest expression of ~hat aspiration 
to the divine which Aristotle sees in Nature and identifies 
. 150 in terms of final causal1ty. In the completely virtuous 
man, then, Nature comes closest to a share in divine life, 
inasmuch as he has achieved the highest excellence possible 
to ·a natural being. 
With this our survey of Nature as it pertains to moral 
excellence in Aristotle is complete. He clearly sees a large 
role for Nature in such excellence and finds it essential to 
any study of ethics. What the thesis claimed at the start 
then has been borne out. And a summary of that here will 
enable us now to see it more quickly. 
In the first chapter, recounting the literature-of.this 
149- See E.N., X, a, 117ab 22-29; cf. Metaphysics, XII, 7, 
1072b 13-1~ and XII, 7, 1072b 23-25. 
150- That all natural beings strive for the divine is unam-
biguously stated at De Anima II, 4, 415a 27- 415b a. For· 
the account of final causality see metaphysics XII, 7, espec-
ially 1072b 3-4. · 
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ce~tury made it clear that Nature's importance in Aristotle~s 
ethical theory had not been given due consideration there. 
Jaeger's 1923 reading of the Protrepticus and the reaction 
to it, as well as to his remarks on the Eudemian and Nicho-
machean Ethics, centered on Aristotle's Platonism or inde-
peodence thereof, i.e., how steadfast, if ever, was Aristo-
tle 1 s allegiance to the Forms and, in turn,-how convinced 
was he of their use in moral knowledge. Equally an issue 
was how the knowledge of the morally good found realization 
in practice, either~ geometrico or by prudential in-
sight~ 
While we found for Aristotle that it is in fact 
through the unrationalizable insight acquired through good 
living that the morally good becomes known, Aristotle en-
larged upon this by describing such good living as being 
according to nature-- i.e., as natural. This we saw in 
chapter two. Confident of Nature as a pervasive and unalter-
able agency of good, Aristotle set it forth as a model ~r 
pattern for the student of ethics in judging moral act-
ions: to judge an action good or bad is likewise to judge 
it as according or contrary to Nature; also to our nature. 
What advances or sustains our being is good,151 and so in 
line with Nature; whereas whatever is demeaning to it is 
opposed to the fullness of our nature, viz., well-being. 
151- See Politics, II, 2, 1261b 9-10. Here Aristotle gives 
us a defin~tion of the good that is rarely ever brought out 
in discussion on him: "the good of things must be that which 
preserves them". English translation by B. Jowett in the 
Basic Works of Aristotle, QQ. cit. 
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This well-being, though, as our fully natural state, 
is the work and funct2on of v1rtuous activity, and is a 
l~fetime task. Such activity, however, as chapter three 
discussed, is not in man by nature; nor is its contrary. 
These are alterable states, virtue and vice, whereas what-
ever is by nature is unalterable. The attainment or non-
attainment of our well-being, therefore, is not due to Nat-
ure; it is due, rather, to us. It is we who are responsible 
for our well-being, and thus we who bring it about. 
But, chapter four suggests, in so doing we are really 
imitating Nature's own workmanship. If Nature seeks the 
good of everything, and virtue in man is precisely this 
striving after what is good, to be virtuous is to be like 
Nature. As Nature br2aags i::lbout only what is good, the 
virtuous man, inasmuch as he brings about his own good, 
does for himself what Nature does at large. And this he 
does through reason, whose excellence in practical matters 
therefore can be likened to Nature, inasmuch as both bring 
about only what is good. 
Aristotle's ethical theory, then, includes within it 
a significant role for Nature, and it was this that merited 
our attention here. Simply stated, Aristotle has suggested 
that in Nature we may find something worthy of our consider-
ation for understanding of human conduct and then why human 





Three definitive studies on the Protrepticus have ap-
peared since D.J. Allan's remark in his 1956 review of Ross• 
Fragmenta Selecta (see Classical Review, VI (1956), 224-5) 
that no one who had hitherto edited the Fragments sought to 
discern their proper sequence or general argument: W.G. Rab-
inowitz, Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Re-
construction. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1957; Ingemar During, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt 
At Reconstruction. Goteborg: Eleanders Boktryckeri Aktie-
bolag, 1961; and A.-H. Chroust, Aristotle: Protrepticus, 
A Reconstruction. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1964. Of these three I have chosen During's edition 
since (A) Chroust's "has freely drawn upon" it, as well as 
widely utilize "D~ring's selection and arrangement of the 
fragments" (p. v, Chroust). Further, Chroust himself re-
commends that for "a more penetrating treatment and study of 
the Protrepticus" we go to D~ring (p. v, Chroust). 
(B) Rabinowitz• belief that there is little anyone can 
say positively about the Protrepticus (p. 95, Rabinowitz) 
has been well-disposed of by During with four arguments. 
(1) Rabinowitz held that it was impossible to.have any pas-
itive evidence for a reconstruction of the Protrepticus and 
along with this, then, teaching there which we could ascribe 
to Aristotle since no ancient authorities had ever mentioned 
the Protrepticus and Aristotle's name together (p. 21, Rab-
inowitz). But on this principle, During remJrks, many of the 
Pre-socratic fragments now accepted as genuine would have to 
55 
be rejected as spurious while, conversely, many texts {and. 
even whole works) that have been conclusively proven to be 
spurious would have to be declared genuine {pp. 13-14, Du-
ring). 
(C) During has shown the Protrepticus as he recon-
structs it to be Aristotle's through an examination of its 
(2-f language: (a) only five per cent of the language does 
not agree entirely with Aristotle's usage; the rest is 
"written in Aristotle's language and style", a style nknown 
to us from writings of undisputed authenticity"; {b) Only 
twelve words of its seven hundred word index do not appear 
in Bonitz. "These twelve are all words of the period; we 
find them in Plato's dialogues or the Attic orators"; (c) 
"The fact that the vocabulary is so unambiguously Aristot-
elian is the first result of the linguistic analysis that 
we can book. It shows that Iamblichus has not tampered 
much with the text." 
(3) Style: "Every phrase has been carefully examined 
and compared with the Academic-Aristotelian usage; the re-
sult is reported in the commentray. Stylistically the 
language is remarkably pure, often with an unmistakably 
Aristotelian ring. 11 
{4) "The inner structure, the manner in which the 
author builds up a series of argumsnts"; this, indeed, 
.. 
I would suggest, conclusively proves During's point. His 
discussion on this, however, is not susceptible to sum-
mary; it is already in its tersest form. For his argu-
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ment (here, #4)~ then, see pages 18-19 of his "reconstruct-
ion". For his overall three points (nn. 2~ 3, and 4 here) 
see pages 17-19. In addition, his introduction ("The Pro-
blem", pp. 9-39) is quite invaluable; and his reconstruct-
ion, appearing as Fragments 8 1-110, a most noteworthy 
achievement. 





























II, a, 199a 20-30 
. II, a, 199a 26-29 
II, a, 199a 34- b 2 
De Generatione ~ Corruptione 
II, 10, 336b 27 
De Anima 
II, 4, 415a 27 - 415b 8 
III, 11, 434a 16-21 
III, 12, 435b 2-7 
QD Memory ~ Reminiscence 
I, 2, 452a 30 
On Youth ~ Old Age 
I, 5, 469a 29 
On the Parts .Q.f. Animals 
II, 14, 658a 23 
IV, 10, 6a?a 17 
De Motu Animalium 
I, 6-7 
Progression of Animals 
I, 1, 704b 6 
I , 12, 711 a 19 
De Generatione Animalium 
I, 3, 717a 17 
II, 4, 73ab 1 
II, 4, 740b 26- 741a 3 
Metaphysics 
XI I, 7 
XII, 7, 1072b 3-4 
XII, 7, 1072b 13-15 
XII, 7, 1072b 23-25 
Nichomachean Ethics 
I, 2-4, 1094a 1a - 95b 11 
I, 3-6, 1095a 1 - 97a 15 
I, 4, 1095b 4-13 
I, 7, 1097a 26-34 
I, 7, 1097a 34- b 20 
I, 7, 1097b 22-27 
I, 7, 1097b 30-35 
I, 7, 1098a 1-20 
I, 7, 1 09ab 2-4 
I, 9, 1099b 20-23 
I, 13, 11 02a 7-24 
I, 1 3, 11 02b 16-17 
I I , 1 , 11 03a 14-16 
II, 1, 1103a 14- b 22 
II, 1, 1103a 14- b 26 
I I , 1 ; 11 03a 1 5-16 
II, 1, 1103a 19- b 22 
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II, 1, 1103a 24-25 
II, 1, 1103b 2-18 
II, 1, 1103b 14-18 
II, 2, 1104a 12-20 
II, 3, 1104b 27-36 
II, 4, 1105a 18-19 
II, 4, 1105a 27- b 4 
II, 4, 1105a 28-34 
II, 4• 1105b 9-13 
II, 5, 1105b 29-32 
I I, 5, 11 06a 3-4 
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I I, 6, 11 06a 15-20 
II, 6, 1106b 17-22 
II, 6, 1106b 18-27 
II, 6, 1106b 36 
II, 6, 1106b 36 - 1107a 8 
III, 1-5, 1109b 30 - 1114b 25 
III, 2, 1111b 10-13 
III, 3, 1113a 4-14 
I I I, 3, 1113a 1 0-12 
III, 4, 1113a 32-35 
III, 5, 1113b 3-20 
III, 5, 1113b 17 
III, 5, 1114b 22-25 
I I I, .6, 1115a 7 - 1116a 15 
III, 7, 1115b 23 
III, 11, 1118b 22- 1119a 18 
IV, 5, 1125b 26 - 1126a 31 
v, 8, 1135a 34 - b 1 
VI, 1 , 1139a 1 5-16 
VI, 1, 1139a 21 
VI, 2-7, 1139a 26 - 1141a 19 
VI, 2, 1139a 29-31 
v~, 3, 1139b 26-31 
\11, 5, 1140a 24-28 
VI, 5, 1140b 1-6 
VI, 5, 1140b 8-10 
VI, 5, 1140b 20-21 
VI, 6, 1141a 3-5 
VI, 9, 1142b 31 
VI, 11, 1143a 33-35 
VI, 11, 1143b 3-5 
VI , 12, 1144a 1 9 
VI, 12, 1144a 29-31 
VI, 13, 1144b 2-17 
VI, 13, 1144b .24-25 
VI, 13, 1144b 26-29 
VI, 13, 1144b 33 - 1145a 2 
VII, 3, 1147a 25-32 
VII, 5, 1148b 17-24 
VII, 5, 1149a 8-9 
VII, 5, 1149a 10-11 
VII, 7, 1150a 9-13 
VII, 8, 1151a 15-19 
VI I , 8, 11 51 a 1 6 
VI I, 8, 1151 a 20-28 
VII, 8, 1151a 23-25 
VII, 9, 1151b 4-11 
VII, 10, 1152a 7-10 
VII, 10, 1152a 15-16 
VII, 11, 1152b 1 
X, 7, 1177a 11-28 
X, 7, 1177b 1 8-26 
X, 7, 1178a 5-8 
X, 7, 1178a 7 
x, 7, 1178b 22-29 
x, 7, 1179b 21-27 
Magna IYioralia 
I, 4, 1185a 36-39 
I, 6, 1186a 2-8 
I, 6, 118oa 3-8 
I, 7-8, 1186a 20-33 
I, 9, 1186b 33-36 
I, 34, 1197b 36 - 98a 21 
I, 34, 1198a 4 
I I , 2, 1199a 10-11 
II, 3, 1199b 37-38·.· 
II, 3, 1199b 37 - 1200a 5 
I I, 10, 1208a 5-21 
I I, 10, 1208a 7-21 
E udemian Ethics 
I, 3, 1215a 15-17 
II, 1, 1219a 24-38 
II,. 1, 1220a 10-11 
II, 1-2, 1220a 38 - b 6 
II, 2, 1220b 3-4 
II, 3, 1220b 32-33 
II, 5, 1222a 6-10 
II, 6, 1222b 17-19 
I I, 6, '1222b 18-20 
I I , 6, 1 223a 1-1 6 
II, 6, 1223a 9-11 
II, 6, 1223a 17-20 
II, 8, 1224b 32-34 
II, 10, 1225b 26-27 
II, 10, 1225b 36-38 
II, 10, 1226b 21-22 
II, 10, 1226b -34-35 
I I, 10, 1227a 18-23 
II, 10, 1227a 20-30 
I I I , 1 , 1230a 27 
III, 7, 1234a 24-32 
VI I , 2, 1238a 1 0-11 
VII, 6, 1240b 20-21 
VII, 14, 1247a 31-33 
VII, 15, 1249a 26 
Rhetoric 
I, 11, 137Da 6-7 
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